Economic consequences of One-Child Policy in China by Boeckx, Anastasia
Institutional Repository - Research Portal
Dépôt Institutionnel - Portail de la Recherche
THESIS / THÈSE
Author(s) - Auteur(s) :
Supervisor - Co-Supervisor / Promoteur - Co-Promoteur :
Publication date - Date de publication :
Permanent link - Permalien :
Rights / License - Licence de droit d’auteur :
Bibliothèque Universitaire Moretus Plantin
researchportal.unamur.beUniversity of Namur
MASTER IN ECONOMY: GENERAL








Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.










Master 120 in Economic Sciences   
 
 






















A LETTER OF THANKS 
I would like to express all my gratitude to my memory director, Mr. Jean-Marie BALAND, doctor in 
Economics, researcher and professor at the University of Namur, for his availability, his patience 
and his judicious advice, which contributed to enrich my reflection. 
I would like also express my sincere gratitude to Mr. Jean-Christophe MUULS, Director-Finance and 
Administration at Carpenter Technology Europe where I work, for his support and his 
comprehension, so that my work doesn’t interfere with studies and vice versa.  
I also thank the Department of Evening Studies of the Faculty of Economics at the University of 
Namur and their professors, represented by Mr. Eric TOULEMONDE   for education of high quality 
who   fed my reflections through many projects, while allowing me to continue my professional 
activity.   
A particular thank you goes to Mrs. Denise VAN DAM, training advisor of the Department of 
Evening Studies of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Namur, for her precious advices 
and moral support during my studying period. 
I thank my husband for his unconditional support, my dear children for their invaluable patience, 
and all my friends and colleagues who gave me their moral support. 
 
















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 
CHAPTER 1. Literature review ...................................................................................................................... 7 
1.1.History of OCP and its causes............................................................................................................... 8 
1.2.Definition   of the one-child policy. .................................................................................................... 11 
1.3.The influence of Western policy on the one child policy. .................................................................. 11 
CHAPTER 2.  Economic consequences of one – child policy. ..................................................................... 13 
2.1.Population. ......................................................................................................................................... 14 
2.2. Fertility rate ...................................................................................................................................... 15 
2.3. The problem of elder care. ............................................................................................................... 18 
2.3.1.Dependency Ratio ...................................................................................................................... 18 
2.3.2.Demographic Change ................................................................................................................. 21 
2.4.Urban and rural areas. ....................................................................................................................... 23 
2.5.Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. ............................................................................................. 24 
2.6.Life expectancy and Health. ............................................................................................................... 26 
2.7.An imbalance in sex ratio ................................................................................................................... 30 
2.8.Labor force ......................................................................................................................................... 35 
2.9.Education ........................................................................................................................................... 38 
2.10.Income Inequality ............................................................................................................................ 40 
CHAPTER 3. Age Pyramid projection of China. .......................................................................................... 43 
3.1. Data and Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 43 
3.2.Estimation results. ............................................................................................................................. 46 
3.2.2Age pyramid. ............................................................................................................................... 46 
3.2.3.Dependency ratio ....................................................................................................................... 48 
3.3.Issues ................................................................................................................................................. 49 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................... 50 






In my work I will analyze the influence of one-child policy on economy and demography of China. 
To demonstrate the real impact of this policy, I’ll compare the economic and demographic 
parameters with another country, South Korea. 
Why   to benchmark these two countries China and South Korea?  
 According to Hye Tae Kim (2016) they have many similarities. They are known for their rapid 
development but in different ways. Both are located on the same Eurasian continent; they have a 
similar culture.  The both countries have preferences for sons. This preference is related to 
Confucian values.  That means that the children take care of its old parents and carry family name. 
The daughters took the name of its husband and went to live in husband’s family. This situation is 
opposite for sons which carry the parents name and lived with them. We can add also that the 
women had much less autonomy and in case of labor they earned less than the men. The same 
problem is a rapidly aging population, urbanization.  
China’s policy has a big impact on sex ratio, especially on a the “missing girls “phenomena. The 
forced abortions and the obligation of contraception decreased significantly the numbers of born 
girls. This fertility regulation was responsible for girl’s discrimination (das Gupta, 2000).  Is this the 
only one for this sex discrimination? We will provide the evidences that there are different 
elements. The factors linked to the economic growth such as later marriage age for men and 
women, more women participation in labor force, higher education level and health standards. All 
these factors contribute not less to the low   fertility rate than the family planning campaigns. In 
China, the government was persuaded that population growth   undermined the economic growth.  
The both countries had the family planning program during many years. 
In South Korea the government of President Syngham Rhee (1948-60) started the first birth 
program. The Christian churches also launched such program in 1957.   Special agencies were 
created (public and private) to control these family programs. In the 1973 Child health organization 
legalized the abortions. In 1983 the government began to suspend the medical insurance for 
pregnant women who had already three or more children. In the late 1980s Korea Institute of 
Planning and other agencies distributed free control devices and information, granted special  
subsides  ( such as low-interest housing interest) to parents who agreed  to sterilization. 
In China population control began in 1956 with the support of Ministry of Public Health. This 
campaign was interrupted by Great Leap Forward. This was an economic and social campaign 
launched by Communist party from 1958 to 1961 year. Mao Zedong wanted to transform the 
agrarian economy to communist society. This agricultural collectivization had to fulfill the quotas 
based on Mao’s exaggerations. The food output declined significantly and caused the starvation 
and the deaths of 45 millions of Chinese people. The same number of birth were lost during this 
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Great Chinese Famine. The second campaign took place in  1963-19661 period .During this 
campaign  the birth rate was cut by a half. In 1973 Mai Zedong order to control population more 
than ever. The one-child policy which began in 1979 gave benefits to one-child families such as 
cash bonuses, longer maternity and child care. The coercive methods were used such as 
sterilization and abortions.  Contraception were distributed among the population and was 
controlled by special officials created in order to survey the realization of this strict policy. 
For both countries the low fertility rate has negative results. Future elderly population might not 
be able to rely on their children as it was before. These two societies became an “aged societies”. 
 








1 Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “ Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 










CHAPTER 1. Literature review 
China is the most populous country in the world. It is the country with the fastest economic growth. 
Very often we associate this country with the one-child policy (OCP). This was the third country 
control to the rate birth (1979-2015). Each family can have only one child in an urban area and the 
second in a rural area is authorized if it is a girl or a disabled person. This program applied radical 
measures such as the prison, the mandatory sterilization, late abortions.                                  
This period destroyed the usual family value where children cared for parents. The families had 4 
to 12 children. The children were a resource for the family income because the workforce was 
cheap. That is why more children resulted in more income.           
The monitoring program has completely transformed an age pyramid. In addition, the preference 
to have boys   led to the fact that for about 120 boys there are only 100 girls. Resulting in the 
rapidly aging population, the monetary resources shortage for the payment of pensions. Women's 
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population is insufficient, resulting in increasing the rate of crime, the general migration from 
village to city to find the woman and the income. This program generated a million of unregistered 
illegitimate children.    
This policy lasted 35 years and ceased to exist in 2015. The new policy is called "The universal policy 
of two children".   
In the context of globalization, China has always strived to achieve Western standard of living. 
According to Ebersatdt (2009): “Next, OCP had a glorious success. It has prevented 400 million 
births, helped the country quickly improve its incomes, and limited the threat of grain. It also eased 
the pressure on resource use and the environment, has improved the living conditions of people 
and has developed their status”.           
The Chinese are perfectionists. They forced their children to study, to be able to get out of the 
deplorable situation and to help their parents later.    
In this literature review, I will present the history of OCP and its causes. 
  
1.1.History of OCP and its causes. 
The population of China was stable (around 50-60 million) from the 1st to the 16th century. It was 
raised during the Song Dynasty in 1100. The traditional idea among families was that more children 
would bring more happiness (Confucianism), which also encouraged national strength. Leaders 
have promoted fertility. Guan Zhong (720-655 BCE) gave the land to the newlyweds. According to 
the Guoyu (speech of the old text): “All women remained single at 17 years of age (men to 20 
years) have committed the crime with their parents. "                           
To support families, the government exempted women from work for two years; gave a dog or a 
pig; provided help with a nurse; gave an exemption of the tax increasing; subsidies for the 
poorest.      
The concepts of "birth planning " and "family planning" were borrowed from the West. It was the 
population theory of Malthus, who was the follower of one rational management principles. This 
Chinese economist studied abroad and is at the origin of this idea. Chen Changheng, economist 
(King 2014), said that the biggest cause of poverty in China is due to too many births. He was 
convinced that only one-child policy can help the population's survival and help to develop the 
country.  
Margaret Sauger, played an important role. She was the leader and founder of the birth control 
movement in United States of America. For the first time, she visited China in 1922 where she gave 
a lecture at the University of Beijing.           
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Resistance to Western thought was supported by Sun Yat-sen and Liao Zhonghai . They are based 
on the size of the population. They assumed that it was "racial destruction". Sun (1928:Lecture 1)2 
compared China's growth with that of other countries and said: "If China does not develop in the 
next 100 years, other countries such as Russia, England, Germany and France could conquer the 
Chinese people due to  the number. "                
The same idea was defended by Marxist campaign (Chinese Communist Party) to which Mao 
Zedong joined later. According to its ideology, "there was not the overcrowding, but poor 
distribution of wealth and the services that begets the poverty. (Gilmartin 1995:5)3. For Marxism, 
"capitalism reserves the additional unemployed who can be employed at any time". (Li Da, 
1984:145)4.                  
For Mao Zedong, the solution to poverty was in production and revolution. In the next years, Mao 
was influenced by the politics of the Soviet Union. The USSR lost around 26.8 million people during 
the Second World War. The government therefore encouraged women to have many 
children.           
The first birth control started in the early fifties. Deng Yiaoping (Shi 1997) was the "creator of birth 
control". In 1954, Deng explained that contraception was "necessary and appropriate", Lin Shaogi 
(1981:II,172)5 gave a speech on dramatic circumstances: "there is not enough clothes, food, 
medicine or schools ...   increase of the birth rate will be more than 2%”. In February 1955, the 
Ministry of Health submitted a report stating that it had to make the masse birth control. In 1952, 
Mao supported family planning. But in 1958, its support declined because of the "Great leap 
forward”6.                
 
2  Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 
the one-child policy ever needed?”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol.75, N.4 (September),p.937  
 
3   Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 
the one-child policy ever needed?”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol.75, N.4 (September),p.938 
4 Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 
the one-child policy ever needed?”, American Journal  of Economics and Sociology, Vol.75, N.4 (September),p.938 
5  Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 
the one-child policy ever needed?”, American Journal  of Economics and Sociology, Vol.75, N.4 (September),p.942 
 
6 “The Great Leap Forward (Second Five Year Plan) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was an economic and 
social campaign led by the Communist Party of China (CPC) from 1958 to 1962. Chairman Mao Zedong launched the 
campaign to reconstruct the country from an agrarian economy into a communist society through the formation of 
people's communes. Mao decreed increased efforts to multiply grain yields and bring industry to the countryside. 
Local officials were fearful of Anti-Rightist Campaigns and competed to fulfill or over-fulfill quotas based on Mao's 
exaggerated claims, collecting "surpluses" that in fact did not exist and leaving farmers to starve. Higher officials did 
not dare to report the economic disaster caused by these policies, and national officials, blaming bad weather for 
the decline in food output, took little or no action. The Great Leap resulted in tens of millions of deaths, with 
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At that time, China had " excessive goals, declining product quality and unbalanced economic 
development", Li Gucheng (1995:91)7. Mao planned to complete social and agricultural 
transformation in ten years.        
All these reforms were stopped by the Great Famine from 1958-1961.   
During this period, agriculture was transformed into steel production, which led to a decrease in 
the food supply. Chinese statistics noted: " 15 million excess deaths." According to Frank Dikotter 
(2010;945)8there were:  "At least 45 million dead". This fact made birth control unnecessary. The 
consequences of population growth from 1965 to 1970 led to the adoption of one child policy. It 
is one of the means of fighting the crisis. Huo (2015:947)9: "A single goal: to have the balance 
between food and people." The Chinese government published the family schedule family and the 
necessity of using contraception.                                
In 1966, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution interrupted birth control for more than ten 
years. In 1973, China announced family planning " One is ok, two is perfect and three are too 
much". Mao Zedong died in 1976. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping created a new constitution in which he 
 
estimates ranging between 18 million and 45 million deaths.[2] About the same number of births were lost or 
postponed, making the Great Chinese Famine the largest in human history.  
Chief changes in the lives of rural Chinese people included the incremental introduction of mandatory agricultural 
collectivization. Private farming was prohibited, and those engaged in it were persecuted and labeled counter-
revolutionaries. Restrictions on rural people were enforced through public struggle sessions and social pressure, 
although people also experienced forced labor. Rural industrialization, while officially a priority of the campaign, 
saw "its development ... aborted by the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward." The Great Leap was one of two 
periods between 1953 and 1976 in which China's economy shrank. Economist Dwight Perkins argues that 
"enormous amounts of investment produced only modest increases in production or none at all. ... In short, the 
Great Leap was a very expensive disaster." In 1959, Mao Zedong ceded day-to-day leadership to pragmatic 
moderates like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping and the CPC studied the damage done at conferences in 1960 and 
1962. Mao did not retreat from his policies and instead blamed problems on bad implementation and "rightists" for 
opposing him. He initiated the Cultural Revolution in 1966 in order to remove opposition and re-consolidate his 
power. In addition, dozens of dams constructed in Zhumadan, Henan, during the Great Leap Forward collapsed in 
1975 under the influence of Typhoon Nina and resulted in one of the greatest man-made catastrophes in history, 
with an estimated death toll between tens of thousands to 240,000”, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Leap_Forward 
 
7 Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 
the one-child policy ever needed?”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol.75, N.4 (September), p.944 
 
8   Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 
the one-child policy ever needed?”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol.75, N.4 (September), p.945 
 
9   Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 




encouraged family planning. The Commission of National Health  and Family Planning (1979:948) 
10notes: " The one is the best, two at most ."                           
Birth control was a strategic issue , otherwise “economic growth will be delayed by population 
growth” (Deng, 2015:949)11.   
  
 1.2.Definition   of the one-child policy.  
So the OCP was: one child for urban citizens, the second child for rural people if the first is a girl or 
a disabled person and ethnic minorities were allowed to have two children. But no restrictions on 
Tibet.              
Administrative measures applied for OCP: 
- Government and state employees could be dismissed;            
- The members of the party were punished by disciplinary measures;           
- The other children were not registered and did not have a " hukou " document giving access to 
education and health care.                  
  
The economic measures applied for OCP: 
- A couple could pay 15 to 20% of their income if the second child was born;            
-  Forced abortions, sterilizations            
 
 1.3.The influence of Western policy on the one child policy. 
The American foundation, the United Nations Fund for Population (UNFPA), played an important 
role in OCP. This organization was mainly managed by the United States government. At the end 
of 1999 United - States has provided 177 million of dollars to finance the process census, the birth 
control and demographic research. The goal was to keep 1.2 billion by the end of the century (Deng 
2015).                        
 
10    Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “Ending an Era of Population Control in China: 
was the one-child policy ever needed?”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol.75, N.4 
(September),p.948 
 
11 Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 
the one-child policy ever needed?”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol.75, N.4 (September),p.949 
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Chinese demographers and officials have been trained by UNFPA. In 1983, the foundation awarded 
the Population Prize to the Minister of Family Planning. The United States expressed " deep 
gratitude" for the way the authorities used the resources to implement the OCP.       
The Rockefeller Foundation and The Japanese financial group also financially supported this policy. 
Condoms and  contraceptive pills production. For John D. Rockefeller III (Critchlow 1996:8)12: " 
Population control was an issue of prime importance and only after the nuclear issue".                 
Between 1965 and 2004, the United States invested a total of $ 17.3 billion in population control 
through the UNFPA.   
The United States National Security Council (1974) provided a memorandum (NSSM-200). The 
main elements for population control were:      
- Legalization of abortion            
- Financial incentive to increase sterilization             
- Indoctrination of children            
- The required control of the population and the stress from other forms such as the withholding 
of disaster to the source and food aid at least that a country implements the control of the 
population problem.                               
UNFPA awarded China an award for "the most remarkable population control program" (Clowes 
2015).    
Zbignies Brzezinshi (1997:164)13, former national security assistant to US President Carter, said: 
"The threat of food shortage is China's weakness, which could be used as a weapon to prevent 
China from becoming a truly global power."     
Brown in 1994 has noted that the problem is not starvation, but the difference between the market 
demand and its population. In the 1990s, China produced 329 million tons of grain and consumed 
335 million tons. Brown thought that birth control was necessary because this could influence the 




12     Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “ Ending an Era of Population Control in China: 
was the one-child policy ever needed ?”,American Journal  of Economics and Sociology, Vol.75, N.4 
(September),p.955 
 
13 Zhine Wang, Ming Yang, Jialing Zhang and Jiang Chang (2016), “ Ending an Era of Population Control in China: was 




CHAPTER 2.  Economic consequences of one – child policy. 
China has undergone radical changes beginning from Mao’s governance. The contemporary period 
of rapid modernization began in the 1980s with implementation of One-Child Policy. The results of 
economic transformation   impacted the daily lives of Chinese people. Das Gupta (2007) and 
Lesthaeghe (1983) talked about “the growth of secular individualism” as a result of changing of 
economic conditions. Jiahong in 2016 explains the rising “individualism” and suggests that China’s 
rapid development was accompanied by highly increasing adhesiveness to individualistic values.  
“At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place his personal interests first; he 
should subordinate them to the interests of the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, 
slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight, and so on, are most contemptible, while selflessness, 
working with all one’s energy, whole-hearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work will 
command respect”.(Mao, 1938/1966, p. 269) 
“In a factory with one thousand or ten thousand people, to have the boss discover you is very hard. 
You must discover yourself. You must develop yourself. To jump out of the factory, you must study… 
If you are waiting for your company to lift you up, you will grow old waiting”. 
(A 17-year-old female factory worker; Chang, 2008, p. 174) 
The both quotations are very different. In 20th century, Mao’s Communist subordinated self-
interest to the interest of the collectivity, considering the personal interest as selfish and 
corrupting. In 21st century, the self-interest is viewed as a motivation to achieve a better future. 
These two totally different opinions caused by incredible social, economic, and political change.  
Influenced by Western countries, and globalization, China’s shift started its industrialization with   
countrywide poverty and difficult economic situation. China has a different political system with 
very different views on individual freedoms if comparing with western countries. The primary goal 
was the material wealth. After appearance  of  China’s open-door policy, Chinese scientists noted 
changes in people’s attitudes or awaked sense of individualism, including self-awareness, 
independence, and a growing concern for personal well-being (Yu, 1997; Bai, 1998). Sun and Wang 
(2010).  Steele and Lynch (2013) found that individualism has an increasingly strong association 
with subjective well-being. In their analyses, demographic indicators commonly correlated with 
individualistic values, such as personal income, employment status, health and demonstrated a 
strong relation with well-being. 
So the reason of rising individualism is an achievement of well -being by every citizen. The well-
being of each person leads to the results of modern Chinese economy. We can look at China’s 








China population is 1,439,323,776 and South Korea Population   as for 51,269,185. 
 
A Population pyramid (also called "Age-Sex Pyramid") is a graphical representation of the age and 
sex of a population.14 
There are several types of pyramids: 
 Expansive - pyramid with a wide base (larger percentage of people in younger age groups, 
indicating high birth rates and high fertility rates) and narrow top (high death rate and lower 
life expectancies). It suggests a growing population.  
 Constrictive - pyramid with a narrow base (lower percentage of younger people, indicating 
declining birth rates with each succeeding age group getting smaller than the previous 
one).  
 Stationary - with a somewhat equal proportion of the population in each age group. The 
population is stable, neither increasing nor decreasing. 
 A pyramid with a wide base and narrow top suggests high fertility and a growing 
population, whereas a pyramid with a narrow base suggests an ageing population with low 
fertility rates. We observe this narrow base for both countries. 
Figure 2.1. Age pyramid, China and South Korea, 2018 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook - This page was last updated on December 7, 2019 
In according to researcher   Quick (2019) South Korea is in « population paradox ». The 





when population swell, decline and then stabilizes. South Korea has a rapidly aging population  , 
low birth rate  that doesn’t replace the  older population. This fact represents a difficult question 
to solve for the future generation. 
We see the same trend for China which will have the same difficulties for future generations. We 
can add the South Korea has almost the same demography results but without such strict family 
police as one-child policy in China during 35 years. 
2.2. Fertility rate 
In according to United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Policy response to low fertility, most of 
the decline took place in the 1970s, before the launching of China’s one-child policy in 1979. The 
total fertility rate dropped by more than one half, from 5.8 births per woman in 1970 to 2.7 births 
per woman in 1980. During the 1980s, fertility fluctuated mostly  above the replacement level 15 
(2.1) of 2.6 births per woman. Then in the early 1990s, fertility dropped below replacement level 
and since then has further declined to around 1.5 births per woman today. Nevertheless, in the 
early 1990’s there was a fast economic development. So this fluctuation can prove that OCP wasn’t 









NOTE  : All the figures in  this thesis are from https://www.worldbank.org/  except if mentioned another 
source.  Data of China doesn’t include China Macao and China Hong-Kong. 
 
Chinese 35-year   one-child policy is resulted in a large share of Chinese families with only one child.  
It is equal to more than 150 million families with only one child. In urban areas, more than 90 
 
15 Replacement level fertility is the level of fertility at which a population exactly replaces itself from one generation to the next. In developed 














































































percent of families have only one child. These only children will face a great difficulty to provide 
economic support to their older parents (through taxes or physical aid to its family). 
The fertility decline took place when China began the wide financial reforms which caused an   
economic boom. From the beginning of 1990s and during the next twenty years’ country lived the 
fastest temp of urbanization, expansion of higher education and improvement in living standards 
doubled.  The highest increase for secondary school enrolment, college and university enrolment 
(about eight times more). The two important forces linked to this rapid economic played in fertility 
decline: the high cost of child for family. We talked about in the beginning that everything becomes 
more and more expensive in the material world. But also an enormous pressure to “get ahead”, 
“to live better than our ancestors/parents”. This is generated by the opportunities during the hyper 
economic growth. Consequently, for Chinese families   it became too expensive to have children.  
That’s why that the number of children is below the replacement level. We can suggest that even 
if there wasn’t this Government’s birth-control policy, fertility would follow the same trend. 
This period of low fertility during the period of the mentioned economic growth accelerated 
drastically    the population ageing. The last Chinese census in 2010 reported that about 14 per 
cent of the population was aged 60 and above. In according to calculation of researchers, if China 
will continue to have a fertility level of 1.47 births per woman, thus the proportion of Chinese aged 
60 and above will rise to 25 per cent by 2030. Following the same tendency during next 20-years, 
the number of Chinese in this age group will rise from about 180 million to more than 350 million. 
This fact places China among the fastest-ageing societies in the world, at the same place as South 
Korea. 
This situation of ageing population poses major challenges. The economic consequences of this 
demographic shift are problems of labor-force supply, savings, investment and tax burden on 
working population. To go back to the idea of rising individualism. One-child policy created this 
individualism, the only and one child in the family became normal. The generation born in 1980’s 










Figure 2.3. Size of population aged 60 and above and ratio of population aged 20–59 to 
population aged 60 and above, China, 2012–2030 (based on an assumed total fertility rate of 
1.47 births per woman) 
 
Source: “Below-replacement fertility in China: Policy response is long overdue”, Policy Brief, N 5 
The fertility rate in South Korea in 2017 is about 1.1 children. To show the contrast, the global 
average in World bank data is 2.5 children per woman.  During the period 1960-2017 fertility rate 
dropped from 6 to 1 children per woman. The key factor of population stabilization is a 
“replacement rate “. This rate is a point at which the number of children born per woman is 
balanced out the number of elder generation death. The worldwide replacement level is 2.1 
children per woman. This means that South-Korean fertility rate doesn’t reach the replacement 
level needed.  The impact of this indicator for future generation is the same as for China. The 
working population will have the strong difficulties to support the elder generation (through tax 
burden or physical   family support). 
This fertility decline reflects the rapid economic development and shows that every person would 
like have a better life and as the   good life conditions become more expensive (cost of child also), 
there is a trend to have les children and to have an opportunity to give the best for one child rather 








































































Figure 2.4.Fertility rate in South Korea, 1960-2017
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2.3. The problem of elder care. 
The Chinese population is a rapidly aging population. According to the China National Committee 
on Aging, the elderly population will reach 300 million in 2026 and to 400 million in 2037.        
Urban Express 2012: "This situation affects the ratio of workers to retirees and requires greater 
care of the elderly for hundreds of millions of Chinese families."     
Traditionally in China, parents lived with these children who looked after them. But OCP and 
urbanization changed this structure to "4 -2-1". This means that they have 4 grandparents, 2 
parents and 1 child (Zhang, 2013). The question is how to take care of all these aging 
parents.             
The generation born after 1980 was the happiest because they were the only child in the family. 
Now these "spoiled" children should take care of their parents financially, physically and 
mentally.    
The aging of the population is increasing rapidly, especially in rural areas. The social programs are 
developing rapidly but not so in rural areas. (World Bank 2009). The government has put in place 
several programs to provide the necessary social protection.           
 
2.3.1.Dependency Ratio 
To demonstrate the dependence of aging population from working population we add the 
Dependency Ratio table.  
The age dependency ratio expresses the relationship between the "dependent population" (ages 
0-15 and 65-plus, referred as "youth" and "elderly") and the "working age population" (ages 16-
64). Higher values indicate a greater level of dependency. The dependency ratio is used to measure 
the pressure on the productive population.  
The estimation of dependency ratio   is essential for economists, bankers, business, industry and 
all other substantial economic segments which can benefit from understanding the impacts of 
changes in population structure. A low dependency ratio means that there are sufficient people 
working who can support the dependent population. This lower ratio allows better pensions and 
better health care for citizens. A higher ratio indicates more financial pressure on working people.  
NOTE: Dependency Ratio does not take into account labor force participation rates by age group. 
Some portion of the population counted as "working age" may actually be unemployed or not in 
the labor force whereas some portion of the "dependent" population may be employed and not 






In published international statistics, the dependent part usually includes those under the age of 
15 and over the age of 64. The productive part makes up the population in between, ages 15 – 




As the ratio increases there may be an increased charge on the active part of the population to 
maintain the pensions of the economically dependent. This results  impacts directly the financial 
expenditures like social security.  
The (total) dependency ratio can be decomposed into the child (youth) dependency ratio and the 




















Youth (0-14 years 




1,012,131,229 70.32% N.A. 
Elderly (65+ years 
old) 172,262,174 11.97% 17 
Total Dependency 
Ratio 427,192,545 29.68% 42.2 
(Youth + Elderly) 
    
 
 













36,742,718 71.67% N.A. 
Elderly (65+ years old) 8,095,870 15.79% 22 
Total Dependency 
Ratio 14,526,465 28.33% 39.5 
(Youth + Elderly) 
    
 
As we can see in South Korea there is more elderly population than in China (15.79% vs 11.97%) 
Therefore, the aging population problem is more   represented in South Korea 
The trend in population change shows that South Korea had in declining it birth rate during the 
period of 35 years from 1979 to 2015. If we compare the values, for example in 1987 China had a 
birth rate as for 23.33 and South Korea has only 15. This clearly shows that there is no really 
necessary to implement the strict family planning policy but to boost the economic development.  
The propaganda of increasing fertility and allowing immigration especially of younger working age 






2.3.2.Demographic Change  
Two countries face the two problems of population change: aging population and low fertility rate. 
This reflects in increasing of elderly population and   decreasing of working-age population. 
The current statistics demonstrates an essential issue for demographers, the   labor shortage and 
the heavy tax burden on working people.  And as a result -  slow economic growth. A labor shortage 
that will pull on both the economy and the pension system for its aging residents. 
 In according to the life cycle hypothesis ( Almas Heshmati,2019),  older people present negative 
savings, an increase in the elderly population leads to a decrease in saving rates, investments, and 
capital accumulation.  These factors, being a production and innovation   factors, decrease 
economic growth. In South Korea there is the highest poverty rate for elderly of any developed 
countries.   In long-term there is an important problem: who will take care of elder people? Because 
of the culture based on Confucian tradition when parents are taking care of children, national social 
security system is implemented slowly.  
The imbalanced sex ratio at birth is due to prenatal sex identification techniques. Even if the sex 
ratio is normalizing now, there are much more males than female for 25-29 cohorts of 
marriageable age. This creates a short-term marriage problem as the cohorts with the imbalanced 
sex ratio age. However, the never married elderly men will have no children to rely upon. Finally, 
career discontinuity for mothers after giving birth leads to the underutilization of human capital.  
One of the main reason for low fertility is a rising in women’s participation in the labor market and 
higher female education levels. Investment in education increases women’s independence and  
their returns to experience in the labor market, leading women to work more in order to have an 
advantage of returns to experience (so that women with longer careers experience have  higher 
wage growth).  The increase in women’s level of education and participation in economic activities 
raises the cost of giving birth. This is directly linked to  decreasing  in fertility rates. 
The rising middle class creates increasing in demand (Alexander Whitebrook,2016). The rise of the 
middle class has negative implications for food and water security. This demand will be limited by 
supply of fresh water and decline in the availability of land due to increased urbanization as a 
resulting from wealth growing. The population becomes rich. The wealthiest portion of  population 
constitutes a large part of global demand for high-end goods. With the income increasing, 
population spends much more on recreation and   health security.  
Demographic change modifies the migration patterns.  This presents an opportunity to use better 
rural-urban migrants for China. But at the same time the urbanization means less land for food 
production. For South Korea   it’s not possible as almost all population is urban citizen.  Foreign 
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immigrants could be a significant supplement of decreasing workforce for both countries. For 
harmonized nation as South Korea it leads to diversification of nationalities (cultures) and its 
acceptance. 
Figure 2.5. Korea’s demographic trends,1976-2016 











   
 
   
   
   
   
   
   




2.4.Urban and rural areas. 
 
China urban population 
In 2018, 59.7 % of the population of China is urban. Historically China was an agrarian country. 
There is still 40% of rural areas which have a great disparity in comparing with urban areas. There 
is much less developed infrastructure, poverty. These are the areas which didn’t benefit a lot from 
economic reforms after 1980’s. During the OCP period China progressively increased its urban 















































































Figure 2.7.Population change  in South. Korea, 1960-2017
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) SP.DYN.CDRT.IN Korea, Rep. KOR












































































Figure 2.6.Population change in China,1960-2017
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) SP.DYN.CDRT.IN China CHN




South Korea Urban Population 
In 2018, 81.6 % of the population of South Korea is urban.  There is only 18 % of rural population. 
Geographically, South Korea has more mountain areas than prairies for agriculture. South Korea is 
poor in land and natural resources. This situation differs country from China. During economic 
growth   the majority of Korean population moved to cities or constructed the cities instead of 
villages. During the same OCP period South Korea progressively increased its urban  percentage 









The huge difference between these two countries may be the reason of better developed South 
Korea than China.  But also the difficulty of construction new life mode for huge Chinese 
population. 
 








































































Figure 2.8.Urban vs Rural Population in China,1960-2018
Rural population (% of total population) SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS China CHN








































































Figure 2.9.Urban vs rural population in South Korea,1960-2018
Urban population (% of total population) SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS Korea, Rep. KOR
Rural population (% of total population) SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS Korea, Rep. KOR
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Both countries have an economic growth. The latest data from World Bank shows that South Korea 
has 31 362 USD in 2018 and China has 9 770 USD in 2018.What do we observe looking at this 
graph?  First of all, during 2000-2018 both countries had massive growth GDP. But China’s growth 
has double growth than Korea’s. The average growth of China during these years is 9.14% and for 





         
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 
Source: World bank national accounts data and OECD national accounts data 
The South Korea had very    fast growth   from 1962 to 1976. It increased from 3.84% to 13.12% 
and it was more impressive than considering the oil crisis in 1974 -1975 (9.46 % and 7.86% growth 
for these two years).  While many developed and developing countries strongly dropped in its GDP 
indicator.  Plus, South Korea as one of the few developed countries which could avoid a recession 
during the global financial crisis in 2008. It’s economic growth reached   6.2% in 2010 ( the fastest  
growth after  7.2% in 2002) and a sharp recovery  from economic rate 2.3% in 2008 and  0.2% in 
2009. 
If we compare with China, it’s economic growth began in 1979 after country opened the economy 
to Western countries when it started the economic reform for six years. In according with “China’s 
economic rise report “(2019): “China experienced the fastest sustained expansion by a major 
economy in history—and has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty.” China’s reforms 
included boosting export, importing high technology into the country, created economic zones to 
attract the foreign investments and trade liberalization (removing partially price control). All these 
factors influence GDP which average annual growth was 9.5% from 1978-2018. This mean that 
China doubles its growth rate every eight years.   






































































Figure 2.10.GDP growth annual (%) inChina & South Korea,1960-2017 
GDP growth (annual %) NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG China CHN ..
GDP growth (annual %) NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG Korea, Rep. KOR ..
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This rapid growth   surely is linked with individualism. The goal of well-being, an objective of life 
satisfaction brought the country to such results. The country’s economic development depends on 
participation and beliefs of each citizen. 
2.6.Life expectancy and Health. 
Analyzing China’s life expectancy and mortality rates for different age groups provides the insights 
on China’s health care system. This factor in according to China Power Team. "Developing or 
developed? Assessing Chinese life expectancy" China Power.  December 28, 2015 sheds light on one 
of China’s most important resources for cultivating power – its own people. 
Life expectancy is one of the key social development indicator that provides an important summary 
of mortality conditions within country. China has made considerable progress in raising the average 
life expectancy across the country from 69.3 years in 1990 to 76.3 years in 2016. And if we are 








China has made impressive growth in life expectancy with given scope of its territory and 
population.  From the 1950’s, China increased its average life expectancy at birth from around 40 
years to over 70 years. This   result was achieved in about 100 years by many advanced economies. 




















































































The biggest factor in rising life expectancy rate was the improvement in public health services, and 
particularly in infant and maternal health. World Bank data indicates that between 1980 and 2015 
(OCP period), China’s mortality rate for children under 5 fell from 60.0 to 10.7 per 1,000,  and this 
reduction is equal to  approximately 80 percent. 
In the same way, improvements in adult mortality rates also raised China’s life expectancy levels. 
In 1980, the mortality rate for adults between age 15 and 60 was  at 140,59 for women and at 
174.32  for men per 1,000, and by 2015, it had been reduced to 64.15 and  100.07 
accordingly.  These  improvements in infant and adult mortality  led to significant increase in life 
expectancy, which was  at 66.37 years in 1980 and reached 75.93 years in 2015. Although mortality rates 
have fallen. But the prioritization of economic growth led to deterioration environmental 
conditions, including air, soil, and water pollution that affects public health.  
Richard Jackson: “Development is wonderful. Rising incomes and affluence allow people to escape 
poverty and fulfill hopes and dreams that they otherwise couldn’t hope to achieve, but it also brings 
along with it the plague of chronic diseases”. This citation proves once more time that the 
economic development improves our life conditions (public health here) and the same time our 
profit –oriented goals pollute the environment that    degrades our health and therefore we 














































































































































Figure 2.13.Mortality rate, adult in China, 1960-2017
Mortality rate, adult, female (per 1,000 female adults) China
Mortality rate, adult, male (per 1,000 male adults) China
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Life expectancy within China varies greatly by region. There are large disparities between the urban 
and rural residents, as well as between the different provinces. Thera are gaps in development 
levels between interior areas pf country which had much more less profit from economic reforms 
than the coastal areas.  
China differentiation urban-rural has a noticeable impact on health income. Researchers Chen, Liu, 
and Yang of the China Health and Nutrition Survey, discovered that rural residents with higher 
levels of education still demonstrated worse health outcomes than similarly educated urban 
counterparts. A 2003 survey indicated that only 20 percent of the rural population had access to 
health care coverage, in comparison to 60 percent of urban inhabitant. In another comparison, the 
gap in average life expectancy between Shanghai and the poorest provinces in 2013 was 13 
years. The rural relative isolation, poverty, lower levels of public infrastructure and expenditures 
created the health disparities. 
In China, Public health was especially turned to the women’s health as they are responsible for household 
health; (Das Gupta, 2000). Women’s health benefited from population control.  These efforts had to ensure 
good conditions for pregnancy, child health. The maternal and child health improvements reduced infant 
mortality (Sidel, 1982). 
Nowadays, South Korea has one of the highest life expectancies in the world: 82 years.  
And to compare UN Population Division confirms the global average as for 72 years. The 
improvements of the health care led the population to extended longevity. The life expectancy in 
1960 was only 55 years. Today this number looks extremely different. It’s increased significantly 
from 2000. Now the newborn baby can expect to live to the age of 82 years. This rise was in parallel 
with industrialization. To compare the OCP period values, we note that in 1980 there was 66.05 
years and in   2015 there is 81.72 years. In China there was for the same period 66.37 and 75.93. 
We note that during the same period South Korea improved it life expectancy for almost 6 years 
more. This gap can be due to less developed rural health services in China than in South Korea. And 






The Worth Health Organization’s World Bank’s “Global Health Observatory,” in 1990 published the 
fact  that “ Korea  nation quickly caught up and currently also have averages higher than age 80. 
The China’s trends are standing at an average of 76 years”. These general trends show general 


















































































































































































Figure 2.16.Mortality rate, adult South Korea,1960-2017
Mortality rate, adult, male (per 1,000 male adults) Korea, Rep.
Mortality rate, adult, female (per 1,000 female adults) Korea, Rep.
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South Korea’s mortality rate for children under 5 fell from 32.77 (1979) to 3.22 (2015) per 1,000,  
and this reduction is equal to  approximately 90 percent. We note that this reduction is at 10 
percent more than in China. This can show the better health income across the South Korea. 
The mortality rate for adults between age 15 and 60 was  at 307,02 for men and at 154.66 in 1  for 
men per 1,000 in 1980, and by 2015, it had been reduced to 87.25 and  35.77 accordingly.   
We can see for both rates the dramatic gains from improved health services as a result of 
development and human’s desire to live longer and better life and have and profit its material 
goods. 
The government’s strategy in South Korea was focused on improving health and reducing fertility 
(Kim, 1990). The improvements in living conditions and nutrition resulted in decline in mortality. 
The “New Community Movement “was organized by government for rural development. The 
results were shown in increasing average of life expectancy (1960-1995). The population control 
program launched in 1962 (Kim, 1972) contributed to rapid reduction in child mortality. In the mid-
1970’s the government perceived that    to maintain the fertility decline, it was needed to reduce 
the son’s preferences.  Since 1980s, the government become more receptive to Women’s 












2.7.An imbalance in sex ratio  
An average sex ratio at birth is 100 baby girls versus 130 baby boys. In 2005, the sex- ratio is 119 
boys for every 1 00 girls. This has led to the fact that a large number of men will never be married. 
According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, by 2020, there will be 30 million to more of men 
than women (China Business News 2015). The factors behind this relationship are: preference for 
yarns; the rate of low of the fertility; the availability of gender detection techniques such as 



















China vs South Korea,2000-2016
Current health expenditure (% of GDP) China Current health expenditure (% of GDP) Korea, Rep.
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The fertility in rural areas is higher because they have been allowed to have a second child if the 
first was a girl. Having a son was more useful for parents, and the second son did not provide the 
allowance after the first daughter. So they only wanted the first son. The son was more productive 
than a daughter. The selection of sex was expensive for rural areas as ultrasonic devices were 
mainly located in urban areas.                    
After Mao's death, the new agricultural reform was created. It was a transition from collective use 
to individuals. This land reform made it possible to allocate an equal share of land to each farmer. 
The latter could make the decisions and dispose of all income once the obligations of the State 
were discharged. This reform has led to increased production and reduced poverty. Douglas (2017) 
estimated that half of the sex ratio increased between 1978 and 1986, during the landing reform 
period. The result is approximately 1 million missing girls. The OCP started at the same time as an 
agrarian reform.                          
The decline in fertility and her preference for boys increased the rate of celibacy. Historically, China 
had a universal marriage for women and a competitive market for men. Universal marriage means 
marriage in all educational groups and in all birth cohorts. The OCP has changed this trend. Many 
men will remain alone without the support of their wives and children. At the same time, many 
women have emigrated to the wealthiest areas to find the husband with better status.  As a result, 
men between 30 and 39 will never be married.  Monica Das Gupta et al (2010) reported that 
unmarried men were concentrated in the poorest areas where the level of social protection was 
low.   
Due to the phenomena of “missing women”, the marriage market shows the bargaining power of 
women.  To attract women for their sons, the boy's parents have a higher savings rate and invest 
more in education.          
This problem can be partially resolved by international migration. The foreign wives from poor 
Asian neighbors can contribute to it. But these countries have a high level of development and 
peasant men can provide the necessary social level for their women. China should raise the 
standard of living in the poorest regions in order to attract wives.  
China and South Korea have both the son preference which is attributed to Confucian values. In 
the case of China’s this strict fertility regulation preference     is responsible for discrimination 
against daughters. In South Korea the son preference is attributed to patriarchal family system and 
low female autonomy (Das Gupta and al,2000). The strong son preference results in high levels of 
excess of female child mortality. 
This son preference can be changed if population shifts living from agrarian society to   the 
industrialized and urbanize modern society with the very different requirements. 
These similar family systems marginalize women effectively and shows the social and economic 
pressure on sons. The kinship systems give parents very little benefit from daughters and strong 
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economic incentives to prefer sons. The preference for the son is keeping even if the bride prices 
paid and the adult women are economically very active. 
The “discrimination “for the girls was realized in different ways: by using contraception if the family 
have enough boys; through   sex-selective abortion which is reflected in sex rations more masculine 
than normal biological rate; through   daughter abandon during early childhood which is reflected 
in higher mortality of girls than boys. 
The prenatal discrimination has shift due to the accessibility of sex-selective technology (Goodkind 
1996). South Korea shows the highest level of sex-selective abortion as it’s access to such 
technology is highest. So South Korea was developed in this sense before China. In China there are 
still people without physical and financial access to sex-selective technology   but still shows the 
excess of female mortality among child’s births. The availability of sex-selective technology 
increases the proportion of “missing” girls.  The sex-rations   raised harshly about 1990 when the 
technology became widespread. This date is not far from the beginning of one-child policy in 1979. 
There was an opinion that the family planning sharped the son preference.  But the voluntary 
fertility decline in South Korea had the high sex ratios as in China without specific family planning 
(and even more than in China; in 1987 there is 1.08 ration for China and 1.12 for South Korea). The 
both fertility decline and sex-selective technology raised the discrimination against girls. Also the 
government policy (through economic reforms) changed and so no more need to have more 
children to have more income. 


























Figure 2.18.Sex ratio at birth (male births per female births) in China & 
South Korea,1962-2017
Sex ratio at birth (male births per female births) China
Sex ratio at birth (male births per female births) Korea, Rep.
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The demographer das Gupta in 2007   affirms that the son preference is declining. 
In South Korea and in China industrialization and urbanization changes the Confucian traditions. In 
industrialized society the population becomes independent from their family. The earning money 
allows to save for old age and that reduces the dependence of the financial support from their 
children (sons).  The urban life is very different from the rural life.  In village communities   the 
members are surrounded by their families and in cities the daily life is separated by apartments 
and offices. This fact reduces the pressure on sons.  The urban mobility also means impossibility to 
care of parents. The same situation is for married women which don’t live always with their 
parents.  Also an access to the higher education shows the   decline for son preference. The growth 
in female education and employment increase the economic value and their contribution for 
family. Even the most conservative groups in rural areas shows a fall in son preference. Surely, 
government policy influences directly the gender inequalities (military regime vs democracy).  
The level of wealth, comfort and material goods (standards of living) which   is measured by 
standards as income per capita and poverty rate. The standard of living includes factors as  
employment, poverty rate, gross domestic product,  year, access to quality healthcare, 
education, literacy rates, life expectancy, and other economic  and social factors of the country. 
The  standard of living is closely related to quality of life. Looking on our sex ratio graph, we can 
see that since 2007 South Korea’s rate has a significant difference with China’s rate (an average of 
0.1 of difference for period 2007-2017).  In according to researchers Jinyoung Kim and others 
(2016), the gender inequality has an impact on long terms growth of South Korea. The strategy of 
creating well-educated workers brought the country to higher levels of labor productivity and 
developed capabilities for facilitating technological adoption and innovation.  South Korea’s 
strategy of export-oriented country led to low-cost and good quality labor. All these factors 
influenced the sex ratio which has dropped down to the normal level. This is an indicator that 
Korean parents no longer perceive any disadvantage in having daughters instead of sons. In a 
modern society women participate more and more in a labor marker that influences the 
productivity and growth in general. 
On the graph below, Das Gupta (2017) shows that when the attitudes change, child sex follows. 
She counted that social norms transformation influenced the son preference decline in 73 percent 
and the increasing of education or urbanization level influenced only in 23 percent. In according to 








Figure 2.19. Sex ratios follow social preference 
 
Das Gupta Monica,2017,” Return of missing daughters”, The New science of   sex and gender, 
September, Scientific American.om 
https://socy.umd.edu/sites/socy.umd.edu/files/pubs/das_gupta_scientific_american.pdf 
 
In China public policies are targeted on decreasing the gender inequality   through media 
campaigns; legislation in family code; sponsoring women’s organizations; financial incentives to 
raise the daughters. Also, the rapid changes in rural areas as developing of non-farming 
employment. Another life sources make citizens more independent of family traditions and 
circulate the urban way of thinking. The South Korea is placed better than China. It’s far ahead in 
terms of industrialization and urbanization. It also has an advantage to be smaller and homogenous 
where the new ideas can be spread easier than in large and different China. As a contrast in South 
Korea, the military policy doesn’t   want to change the social norms. This tendency slows down the 
diffusion of new values. South Korea could decline son preference before it became high 
developed country without the compensation military policy.  
The son preference is needed to be changed. The government policies and support can help to 
change the social norms and relying only on increasing women’s education. The expansion of 
media with women portrays helping their aged parents could change the stereotype of son 
preference (Das Gupta,2017). To change the old habits, to adapt the ancient culture to modern 
society. This cultural change can lead to more girls but countries will need one generation to 





The female labor participation in agrarian countries is working women in the farm. But this work is 
largely depressed. The is because the women’s position in the kinship is marginal. Even if the 
women do almost all manual labor in agriculture, the production is perceived to be the men’s as 
the take the decisions and are the owners of the land.   In China there were efforts   to recognize 
women’s contribution by families and communities in agricultural work (Xie,1997). Paid work is 
valued much more than the work in farm. Investments in daughters will be perceived as investing 
in another family until women adults contribute little to their parent family in according the 
tradition as they are considered as a part of husband’s family. 
The growth of women’s paid employment will reduce son preference if the public policy will 
contribute to parents well-being. In China, women’s employment grew in the new industrialized 
market economy. This was part of effort of Communist China (Xie, 1997). By contrast, women of 
South Korea participated actively in paid work since 1960 but the conservative public policy doesn’t 
give enough benefit to parents from daughters as from sons.  
If we look at Figures 2.20 and 2.21 below “Output structure “, we see that China has still in its 
structure an agriculture percent which more than those of South Korea. At contrast South Korea 
had already before 1980 the manufacturing in its output and the China implemented 
manufacturing only from the 2004. So from the fist view, South Korea began its economic much 
earlier than China.  This can give the idea that in 20 years China will have the same indicator’s level 




          
          
         
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          































































































Figure 2.20.China output structure,1960-2018 
Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP)
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)














NOTE: Industry converts inputs or intermediates to a final output or services, which may or may 
not use machinery. Manufacturing is the process of transforming raw materials into finished goods, 
by deploying various sequential processes, labor, and machinery. 
 
After looking at the labor participation rate, we clearly note that from the 1990’s the female 
participation in China was significantly higher than in South Korea. This fact is linked with the strict 


























































































Figure 2.22.Ratio of female to male labor force participation rate (%), 
China vs South Korea,1960-2019
Ratio of female to male labor force participation rate (%) (modeled ILO estimate) SL.TLF.CACT.FM.ZS China CHN




















































































Figure 2.21.South Korea output structure,1960-2018
Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP)
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)















It’s necessary to create the policies that raise the value of girls to their parent’s relative to boys to 
reduce discrimination against girls.  For example, in China there were certain efforts to decrease 
the gender inequality but these efforts didn’t change the fundamentals of the family system. 
Actually this family system when women take care of their husband’s parents and children is 
benefic for the state. This family model maintains social stability and liberate the government from 
caring of   the old, the young and the unemployed (Das Gupta and al.,2000). So the women’s 
situation is improved but discrimination against girls is still exists. 
The government in South Korea made an accent   on raising incomes of all population (men and 
women altogether). And there was a little effort to ensure the gender inequality. In this way, 
women’s situation in material question was improved significantly but their family position much 
less. Standards of living have improved with technological innovations in domestic work. Also 
women are profited in terms of women’s health and child’s care and the general care as well.  The 
Education and women’s participation in employment raises constantly. 
In China, under the Communist regime, with collective production, women workforce was 
incorporated in   both agriculture and industry (das Gupta, 2000) Thus, the women’s income was 
perceived as essential to the family and they gained voice in decision making. At the same time, 
they are also the participants in community life. But since 1979, China shifted from collective 
production to market economy. In the rural areas the family became   the part of “household 
responsibility” system. In the urban areas job market was supplemented by private business. Under 
these conditions   living standards were improved significantly but this   impacted gender equity. 
The women’s work in agricultural sector became invisible.  In rural areas the men migrated from 
agrarian sector to high-paying jobs and women took care of agricultural production. In urban areas, 

















































































Figure 2.23.Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+), 
China vs South Korea,1960-2019
Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate)
SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS China CHN
Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate)
SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS Korea, Rep. KOR
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women workers had the negative effect. The companies found women very expensive as 
employees and insufficient. This protection was used as justification of lower wages for women. 
As South Korea is poor in land and natural resources, so government concentrated its efforts on 
growing up the skilled and healthy workforce. The living conditions for both sex were improved but 
women’s participation was still very low. The women work force increased in recent years but there 
is discrimination in wages, limited opportunities and male-oriented culture. The parents educate 
son to get a good job and a daughter to get a good marriage with high income (National Statistical 
Office, 2000). As the women’s main role in South Korean society is to be a wife and mother, the 
employers expect that female employees leave their jobs when marry. 
To underline the individualism as the level of well-being, we see that both countries    involved all 
the population into the economic development.  Unfortunately, the women are still discriminated 
because of the   fundamentals of family system. But as economic development led to 




Traditional education in South Korea is based on Confucian Classic and was confined to males. The 
girls’ objective was to “be good wives and wise mothers”. Primary school become universal only in 
1960s. the gap in middle and high Scholl enrollment began to narrow in 1970s and didn’t close 
completely in 1995.  
Literacy rate in South Korea is 99%. This is the result of state effort which was concentrated on 
creating skilled workforce. 
 In China the Communist regime gave the universal education to both sex. This   was changed after 
economic reforms in 1980s. The gender gap in schooling was high in rural areas (Honig , 1988). 


























Figure 2.24.Literacy  rate in China,1982-2018 
Literacy rate, adult male (% of males ages 15 and above) China
Literacy rate, adult female (% of females ages 15 and above) China
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On schematic representation of women’s lives we find that in 2000 the Chinese women have lower 
living standards but better   social situation. In contrast, South Korean women have very high living 
standards but “women power” is very low. We can conclude that Chinese women are more 








Figure 2.27. Schematic representation of changes in women’s lives along two dimensions, China & 
South Korea 1950-2000 















Economic development and human satisfaction of well-being leads to income inequality. Personal 
growth, self-development is considered as the most important life priority for young Chinese. 
The China’s economy main feature is  a high level of income inequality . According to the Asian 
Development Bank Institute, “before China implemented reform and open-door policies in 1978, 
its income distribution pattern was characterized as egalitarianism in all aspects.” At this time, the 
Gini coefficient for rural – urban inequality was only 0.16. As of 2012, the official Gini coefficient in 
China was 0.474, but   scientists suggest China’s inequality much greater. A study published in the 
PNAS estimated that China’s Gini coefficient increased from 0.30 to 0.55 between 1980 and 2002. 
In 2012, a report published by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics estimated the 
Gini index of China at 0.61. China's government publishes an official yearly calculation of the 
country's Gini index. According to these reports, the average Gini coefficient between residents 
was .475 between the years of 2003 and 2018, reaching a high of 0.491 in 2008 and a low of 0.462 
in 2015. 
China is an emerging economy, with quarterly GDP growth rates averaging 9.31% for the past 
twenty years. However, China has a socioeconomic issue as the increasing income disparity 






between  rural-urban citizen. Despite stable economy growth through the number of reforms since 
1979, China’s  the rural-urban income gap reached its widest in more than three decades in 2009. 
According to data from National Bureau of Statistics of China, city inhabitants were earning 3.33 
times as much as farmers (income ratio of 3.33:1).In contrast, the income disparity was at its 
narrowest in 1983, at 1.82:1, due to effects of the Household-responsibility system introduced in 
1978. As of year 2010, income ratio was recorded at 3.23:1. In 2014, according to an Institute of 
Social Science Survey, Peking University, income inequality among Chinese mainland citizens has 











There are few factors of Chinese income inequality. 
Urban-biased policies 
According to PNAS study, more than 10% of China’s total inequality is attributed to the rural-urban 
gap. Researcher Dennis Tao Yang published in the journal of the American Economic Association  
that China’s base of rural-urban categorization  “lies in the strategy of the centrally planned system 
that favored heavy-industry development and extracted agricultural surplus largely for urban 
capital accumulation and urban-based subsidies”. In the 1980s and 1990s, state investments in the 
rural economy accounted for “less than 10 percent of the budget, despite the fact that the rural 
population was about 73-76 percent of the national population.” The  research published in the 
Journal of Economic Modelling demonstrates that two main drivers for rural-urban inequality are  
the Hukou system and absence of a fully functioning land market. 
Inland-coastal inequality 
 
The inland-costal inequality is playing an important role in income inequality across China. 



















Figure 2.28.GINI index (World Bank estimate) China,1990-2016
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coastal inequality in terms of levels, the trend is very different. The rural-urban contribution has 
not changed very much over time, but the inland-coastal contribution has increased by several 
fold,”. The studies found that variations across Chinese provinces account for about 12% of the 
country’s overall income inequality. Research on economic growth after the opening of the 
Chinese economy that between 1989 and 2004, income in coastal provinces more than tripled and 
doubles in inland provinces. Research on inland-coastal inequality indicates that "since being a 
coastal province is a geographic advantage that will persist, this tendency for divergence will also 
probably continue".  Economists Ravi Kanbur and Xiao Zhang propose that the “greater ease of 
rural-to-urban migration within provinces, compared to the institutional and other difficulties of 
migrating from inland to coastal provinces” can partially explain this fact. China’s Hukou system is 
an institutional factor that significantly inhibits interprovincial migration. The government provides 
efforts to encourage the growth in small and medium sized cities by introducing policies that relax 
Hukou restrictions. “Currently rural incomes are less equally distributed than urban incomes but 
urban inequality is increasing faster than rural inequality” (Wu, 2005). 
Demographic Change 
 
According to research published in the China Economic Review, population aging at the beginning 
of 2000’s is “largely responsible for the quick increase in income inequality in rural China”. As a 
result of the one-child policy, a small number of young adults have reached the working age over 
the course of the last ten years, leading to a significant “fall in the ratio of household members of 
working age.” This created a labor shortage, which in combination with the rapid expansion of 
industrialization served to increase income inequality.  
 
South Korea, has been known for very equal distribution of income and wealth. But this has been 
changing over the last twenty years. Statistics shows that in the 1990s income equality reached a 
peak and has declined since then. This may be due an economy that was expanding rapidly and 
then slowed   down significantly. In a modern competitive job market, the head of household is 
expected to be more educated. It makes hard competition for rural families which have a lack of 
access to higher education. This lack leads to unequal pay outside of cities. Some researches 
determinate this change in income inequality to the change of traditional head of household 
dynamics in South Korea.  There is an increase in single headed households. Low access to new 
jobs created a big problem of surviving which led many Korean people not to have families at all. 
The rapidly aging population requires healthcare.  Demographics studies concluded that the elder 
people have the lowest income and do not have the proper social protection. In recent years “the 
proportion of aged 65 and older among people with disabilities has quickly increased, from 30.3% 
to 43.3% in 2014. 
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OECD listed several factors among the reasons for poverty in Korea. First, public social spending in 
South Korea is low. Social spending by the government in South Korea was 7.6% of GDP in 2007, 
compared to the OECD average of 19%. This can be explained by the Korean traditional reliance on 
family and the private sector to provide such services. Second, Korea’s labor market, has a 
significant number of workers which are hired only on temporary contracts with low wages and 










The Gini coefficient was at 0.345 in 2018, down 0.009 from the previous year, according to joint 
data from Statistics Korea, the Bank of Korea (BOK) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). It 
was the lowest since 2011. The index declined from 0.388 in 2011 to 0.352 in 2015, before edging 
up to 0.355 in 2016. It turned downward to 0.354 in 2017 and 0.345 in 2018 each. 
CHAPTER 3. Age Pyramid projection of China. 
This section discusses the projection of China’s age pyramid for one generation. The goal of this 
estimation is to demonstrate the population changes and its impact on dependency ratio based 
on two hypotheses. 
3.1. Data and Methodology 
We know that China stopped One Child Policy in 2015 and replaced it by new policy which allows 
to have the second child. In this part of my paperwork I estimate an age pyramid over one 
generation. The hypothesis is that one generation represents 25 years. Thereby I consider the time 
horizon as for 25 years. In my case this will be projection from 2019 to 2044 year.  
The data used for estimation was downloaded from https://www.populationpyramid.net/china/2019/ 
I present age pyramid in according to two hypotheses: 















Figure 2.29.GINI index (World Bank estimate) Korea, Rep.,2006-2012
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2. The Chinese women continue to follow the OCP and modern trend, thus they   have only 
one child. 
 
For age pyramid calculation I used the following indicators: 
  Table 3.1. Indicators used for estimation 
Mortality rate, infant, female (per 1,000 live 
births) 
Average  = 6.9 
Infant mortality rate, female is the number of 
female infants dying before reaching one year of 
age, per 1,000 female live births in a given year 
(2019. 
 
Death crude rate 
 Average = 6.8 
 
Crude death rate indicates the number of deaths 
per 1,000 midyear population (2019). 
 
 
Life expectancy at birth ,76 years in 2016 Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of 
years a newborn infant would live if prevailing 
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were 
to stay the same throughout its life. 
 
Source : https://www.worldbank.org/ 
Note: Life expectancy indicator used for calculation is projected based on data period 1979 (66y) 
to 2015 (76y) year. Based on this data, I calculated the average life expectancy growth which is 
3.5y per 1 year (Period of 35y has the 10y life expectancy growth. So 35/10 =3.5y/year life 
expectancy growth). This gives life expectancy for 2044 as for 84y. The projected value is valuable 
if the assumed growth will continue to occur. 
 
First step for age pyramid estimation is the population transposition of one generation, 25 years, 
from the initial China pyramid in 2019.  That means the shifting of age data from 0-24 age block to 
25-49 age block; 25-49 age block shifts to 50-74 age block; 50-54 age shifts to 75-79 age block and 
55-59 age shifts to 80-84 age block.  
The second step is an applying of our two hypotheses. So that every woman from 25 to 49 age has 
2 or 1 child accordingly from 0 to 24 years old. 
Population 25-49 age *2 (H1) and Population 25-49 age*1 (H2) 
After that I apply Mortality rate, infant for population 0-4 years old and Crude Death rate from age 
of 5 to 100+ age block population. 
Population 0-4 age (H1 & H2)   - Mortality rate, infant 
Population 5-84 age (H1 &H2) -  Crude Death rate 
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My age pyramid projection is estimated for both sexes altogether without distinction of female 
and male data. 
After that I calculated separately the population   85 to 100+ age. I consider that Life Expectancy 
in 2044 is 84 years old as mentioned before. For the oldest age block I need to estimate differently. 
For this rough calculation I created a table with ratio average 85-100+ age to 0-84 age block during 
5 years (2015-2019). 
Table 3.2. Age ratio of 85-100+ age related to age 0-84 age population (2015-2019)  
 
  Age ratio of age 85-100+ related to  age 0-84 age  population ( 2015-2019)    
         
  2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 Average 
85-89 0.00518 0.00499 0.00475 0.00443 0.00407 0.00468 
90-94 0.00160 0.00155 0.00146 0.00134 0.00118 0.00142 
95-99 0.00037 0.00036 0.00032 0.00027 0.00024 0.00031 
100+ 0.00005 0.00004 0.00004 0.00003 0.00003 0.00004 
 
This ratio average is applied to my population estimation for 2 hypotheses as a following:  
















Based on estimated population projections, I built the age pyramid for 2 hypotheses. 
H1: 2 child 




































































































 1,214,454  
 
 
As we can see, with H1, China’s pyramid has a trend to be an expansive type of pyramid with larger 
percentage of younger population and a wide base but it doesn’t have a narrow top as the life 
expectancy is growing, there is a high percentage of older population as well. 
 For H2 we note that Age pyramid has constrictive type with a narrow base, the lower percentage 









































H1 :2 child 
Age Group 







Youth (0-14 years) old) 272,280 18.33% 32.81 
Working  Age Population 
(15-64 years old) 829,839 55.88% N.A. 
Elderly (65 + years old) 382,973 25.79% 46.15 
Total Dependency Ratio 
655,253 44.12% 78.96 Youth +Elderly 
 
H2 : 1 child 
Age Group 







Youth (0-14 years) old) 114,009 9.39% 15.82 
Working  Age Population 
(15-64 years old) 720,630 59.34% N.A. 
Elderly (65 + years old) 379,816 31.27% 52.71 
Total Dependency Ratio 
493,825 40.66% 68.53 Youth +Elderly 
 
 
After calculating Dependency ratio based on age pyramid estimation, we can see that the Total 
Dependency ratio is very high for both hypotheses. These high ratios indicate the enormous 
financial pressure on working population. 
The new two-child policy will not help in 25 years but only will figure up pressure on working 
population. This population will need to support the youth cohort. It needs one more generation 
or plus to decrease the dependency ratio. 
A high dependency ratio means the lack of working-age population. This lack will change the labor 
supply and thus will increase the labor cost. The raise of labor cost will weaken the advantage of 
China- cheap labor force. This fact will slow the economic growth. 
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From the other side, the extended longevity requires more savings and the education investments. 
This matter of fact impacts the economic growth in positive way. 
By prolonging the retirement age, China can raise the working population and so decrease the 
dependency ratio.  
 
3.3.Issues 
The high dependency ratio decreases economic growth due to the large amounts of dependents 
that pay little or no taxes at all. This high ratio can cause serious problems for a country as a large 
proportion of a government's expenditure is on health, social security and education, used by the 
youngest and the oldest population.  
Nevertheless, there are the limits of dependency ratio such as the fact that 65+ age group are not 
always dependent. There are always the percentage which continues to work. Another fact that 
many of “working age” population are not actually working. 
The solution may be the promotion of immigration for younger people of working-age. This can 
stimulate a higher economic growth because the working-age population will grow if more young 

















In my work I tried to respond to the question if   the China’s rapid economic growth would have 
had the same results with or without the One Child Policy. To build my response I compared the 
demographic situation and economic indicators with the similar country, South Korea. 
The major factors associated with economic growth a later marriage age, more women 
participation in labor force, higher education level and higher health standards are very similar in 
both countries. However, South Korea didn’t have such strict family planning policy as OCP in China. 
The economic reforms launched the opened, market-oriented economy in China at the same time 
as the launch of OCP. This harsh economy   change created the main goal of globalization- the well-
being of every citizen.  
The low fertility rate is below the replacement rate for China and South Korea. The economy boost 
made the life more expensive, including the child’s birth.  The enormous pressure to be successful 
made the parents to prefer less kids in order to give “the best” standard of living than few kids and 
give “the medium” standards. 
The imbalanced sex-ratio is due to Confucian traditions and the low fertility rate. In its turn, the 
low fertility rate is a result of economic growth which includes the women’s independence. This 
growth gave the opportunity to use the sex-selection technologies.  South Korea has lower sex 
ratio at birth but this country began the economic development 20 years earlier than China. China 
can reach the same level as South Korea if maintains the economic growth rate at same paste or 
higher. China has a comparative   advantage as Chinese women are more independent than in 
South Korea. 
As an evidence, the economic growth led to income inequality within the population with the aged 
population being the most vulnerable part. The major income gap is between urban and rural areas 
where rural areas don’t have the same labor possibilities as in urban ones. The health care is 
expensive and the Confucian tradition to rely on family is still very strong. 
The population age pyramid shows the aging population with low fertility rates for both countries. 
The increasing   standards of living raised the life expectancy and health care norms. There is the 
same trend in Dependency ratio. That is the decreasing of working-age population and increasing 
of elderly population. This situation slows down the economic growth. 
The pyramid projection for China with 2 child birth per woman provides us the high dependency 
ratio and the bigger pressure on working-age in 25 years. The solution may come from the 
migration of working-age population from other countries. The pyramid projection with 1 child 
birth per woman provides also very high dependency ratio due to the lack of working population 
and the bigger proportion on elderly people. As the life expectancy will continue to increase, 
country will have more and more ageing population to support. This assumption may be reliable if 
China will maintain the same level of growth rate. 
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To   conclude, based on the comparison of China with its similar neighbor, socio-economic 
indicators shows that One-Child Policy   was not needed but only the openness of economy and 
globalization policy in order to achieve the current results. This modern trend led to hyper 
economic growth and radical changes in population’s way of living. Certainly, China has to think 
about its development differently to be competitive on the global market. China can take as an 
example    South Korea and invest more in human capital, growing more intellectual, educated and 
innovative labor force. That means to pay more attention to the quality of population and not to 
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